Political Mobilization in Bahrain: A Historical Overview and Future Prospects

Bahrain’s unique position in the Persian Gulf offers an interesting case study of how political mobilization is possible for citizens who live under strict minority rule. Unlike its Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) partners, Bahrain consists of a 70% primarily Twelver Shi’i majority. While it is not accurate to place recent political events in Bahrain exclusively within the context of the ongoing Iran-Saudi Arabia rivalry, it is difficult to understand the sectarian nature of the ruling regime towards its Shi’i citizens without considering the events of 1979 (and 2003) and its implications on the wider relationship between Sunnis and Shias in the region and globally.

By: Will Crass and Juliana Rordorf

Bahrain’s unique position in the Persian Gulf offers an interesting case study of how political mobilization is possible for citizens who live under strict minority rule. Unlike its Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) partners, Bahrain consists of a 70% primarily Twelver Shi’i majority, with the majority of the remaining citizens adhering to Sunni Islam. The ruling Sunni Al-Khalifa family has served as the monarchs of Bahrain since the late 18th century, when they invaded the island from what is now modern day Saudi Arabia. Bahrain’s citizens remain predominantly Arab Shi’i (though there are also significant Iranian Shi’i and Ajam communities in the country). This is the case despite a combination of conquest and reconquest of Bahrain by foreign powers and large-scale expatriate settlement from a variety of Western and South Asian countries (among others), especially following independence from Britain in 1971.[1]

The Development of Domestic Politics

Another distinguishing factor from other Gulf countries, with the exception of Kuwait, is the fact that Bahrain exists as a constitutional monarchy. Initially created through a decree by former Emir Isa bin Salman Al Khalifa in 1972, the National Assembly primarily served as an advisory body that recommended legislation to the monarch. This reform was short-lived, however, as Bahrain was put under emergency law two years later and continued to suppress democratic participation throughout the 1970s, ‘80s and ‘90s, as a result of various moments of popular mobilization against the regime, including a coup attempt in 1981 by the Iranian-backed Islamic Front for the Liberation of Bahrain which was arguably the first real minority challenge to Sunni rule.[2] After the resulting lengthy break in constitutional rule, the new Emir Hamad Bin Isa Al Khalifa declared his plan to engage in widespread democratic reforms in the country. The 2001 National Action Charter, overwhelmingly supported by the public, set the stage for the approval of the 2002 Constitution that was meant to reinstate Bahrain’s system of Constitutional Monarchy. Included in the Constitution is the re-establishment of the National Assembly, this time with a bicameral national legislature consisting of the Shura Council (upper house) and Council of Representatives (lower house).[3]

Despite democratic reforms and promises of genuine legislative participation, many Bahrainis were not fooled by the Emir’s public attempts to re-engineer the Bahraini political system. Complaints that the new Constitution violated liberties previously granted in the 1973 Constitution and widespread frustrations with the lack of reforms were abundant. The Shura Council consists solely of appointees of the King, effectively giving the monarch full control over legislation in the country as well as over appointments of the Prime Minister and the Cabinet.[4] Critical, and perhaps foremost amongst this frustration is the lack of opportunity for Shi’is to join security forces and the military.[5] Bahraini Shi’is are also discriminated against in hiring processes, salary allocation, travel ability, educational opportunities and more. To make matters worse, the monarchy has engaged in a campaign of naturalizing citizens from predominantly Sunni countries, which many Bahraini Shi’is see as clear attempts by the Al-Khalifa regime to alter the country’s demography in favor of the Sunni minority.[6] As a result of this difficult reality, many Bahrainis have been faced with the choice of participating in a political system that is rigged against them or refusing to legitimize the elections and boycotting them. Both strategies have been attempted throughout the last two decades of Bahraini general elections, though to little avail.

Despite the initially enormous support for the 2001 National Action Charter, there was a sense of ominous skepticism in Bahrain in the lead up to the 2002 General Elections, as many doubted the legitimacy of the Emir’s efforts to return Bahrain to a constitutional monarchy. Many prominent political parties boycotted the elections, most notably the Al-Wefaq party, the largest political movement in the country. Following the coronation of King Hamad Al-Khalifa in 1999, Al-Wefaq was established by returning political exiles with new hopes of democratic participation and influence. These ambitions quickly wore away, however, and Al-Wefaq led a multi-party boycott of the 2002 elections.[7] It was clear over the course of the next four years that political participation would be difficult as a result of government repression. In 2005, for example, Emir Hamad Al-Khalifa announced a new law banning all political parties which was ratified in the 2005 Political Societies Act. The ban included a strange distinction, however, in which the Emir clarified that “political movements” would be permitted, provided that they were not based on sect or any other identity-based condition— a clear attempt to suppress Shi’i organization.[8] This development forced an internal split in the Al-Wefaq party, among others, regarding whether or not to participate in the elections. The pro-participation camps entered in the 2006 elections, but the splintering of parties, gerrymandering, and government suppression of political mobilization in mosques and other community centers prevented a landslide win in the Council of Representatives, with the opposition finishing with just shy of 50% of the seats.[9] The 2010 election saw greater consolidation of Al-Wefaq’s allies, but division and suppression remained, and only marginal gains were achieved.[10] Despite constitutional changes in the years leading up to the election, results simply reinforced the status quo in Bahraini politics.

Regional Dynamics at Play

In 2011, like other countries in the region, Bahrain experienced widespread protests, demanding real representation in Parliament and the implementation of a new constitution, among other reforms. In a scene similar to the Egyptian Revolution, tens of thousands of Bahrainis gathered at Pearl Roundabout, a central traffic circle in the capital city of Manama, to pressure the government in ways that had not previously been attempted. While demonstrations generally require a special permit from the government, Bahrainis took a bold step in defying the monarch and gathered anyway demanding the real political reform that had been promised but never delivered in recent decades. While this uprising was unique in terms of its scale, the results in terms of concessions won were similar to previous uprisings—nothing was gained. Instead, the Revolution was brutally crushed by the Government with the help from the Saudi-led “Peninsula Shield Force” who viewed the protests as having been infiltrated by Iranian elements.[11] Less acknowledged in the West, but certainly critical, was the United States’ support for the military intervention to crush the protests. Bahrain hosts U.S. Naval Forces Central Command (CENTCOM) and the U.S. Navy’s 5th fleet. As a result of these important sites, the Americans were concerned with ensuring the continued security of the sites. Both Bahraini citizens and the Bahraini government responded to the result of the 2011 uprisings with drastic measures. Thousands of Bahrainis boycotted the 2014 elections and in 2016, the government banned most opposition political societies—including Al-Wefaq—and a further amendment to Article Five of the Political Society Law[12] was implemented, stating that religious clerics were not allowed to participate in elections.[13] Between election boycotts and government regulation, essentially all forms of legal Shi’i political participation in the Bahraini legislature have been stifled.

The lack of success of the Shi’i led opposition in Bahrain begs the question of potential strategies moving forward. Altering the political system is made more difficult, furthermore, by the reality that the United States has a vested interest in continuing the status quo of the Bahraini government, and thus a continuation of the oppression of Shi’i Bahrainis, in order to guarantee the continuation of its military sites. Various kinds of Shi’i political mobilization have been attempted, but participation in the system, boycotts, and outright protests outside the system have all been met with the same blunt force. Is it possible to mobilize successfully when such a powerful actor like the United States will oppose any radical change in the country? While Saudi Arabia provided the manpower in the intervention, the Saudi military crossed the King Fahd Causeway in American-made vehicles, with American-made weapons, and with logistical support from the U.S. military. The publicly stated goal of the intervention was to force out “foreign enemies” within the ranks of the protestors, ignoring the fact that the uprising was arguably the most widely supported uprising among the Arab Spring protests. How much does the U.S. contribute to the anti-Shi’i rhetoric and oppression that exists in the Region today in order to preserve its stated interests and positions? While both the Saudi and the Bahraini governments both officially subscribe to conservative strains of Islam that are explicitly anti-Shi’i, it is difficult to divorce the propagation of these beliefs from U.S. strategy in the region, as further division between Shi’is and Sunnis is perceived by some to be advantageous for U.S. arms sales, military presence, and perceived security interest for the United States.

While it is not accurate to place recent political events in Bahrain exclusively within the context of the ongoing Iran-Saudi Arabia rivalry, it is difficult to understand the sectarian nature of the ruling regime towards its Shi’i citizens without considering the events of 1979 (and 2003) and its implications on the wider relationship between Sunnis and Shias in the region and globally. The 1979 Iranian Revolution and Ayatollah Khomeini’s subsequent rise to power caused a great deal of anxiety for Bahrain’s rulers. The island itself had been a historic point of contention between Arabs and Persians for centuries and it was only through a 1970 referendum that Bahrainis chose independence over joining Iran.[14] After 1979, Revolutionary Shiism was embraced by some groups in Bahrain who were geared more towards the Khomeinist Wilayat al-Faqih ideology[15], but many others viewed the Revolution as a political victory against an oppressive regime without necessarily owing Khomeini any political allegiance. Aside from the diverse set of reactions within the Bahrain Shi’i community towards the newly formed Islamic Republic of Iran, the frightened Bahraini monarchy tended to associate any form of political Shi’ism with Tehran as an excuse to repress any attempts of Shi’i political mobilization. This distinction is important to make, as there is a tendency to overemphasize the transnational nature of Shi’i politics. There was, in fact, a transnational reaction among states from Iraq to Saudi Arabia, as the Sunnis in power feared a similar scenario taking place among their own large Shi’i populations. Many Shi’is however, despite religious connections to Iran, have sought to create their own avenues of political change in search of greater rights, recognition and opportunity in their own countries, separate from any Iranian agenda.

Shi’i political mobilization in Bahrain is squeezed between the forces of transnational anti-Shi’i movements and the pressure of great powers who have a vested interest in preserving the status quo on the Island.[16] In order for Bahraini Shi’is to have freedom and legitimate representation in the government, the United States needs to reassess its support of sectarian forces in Bahrain (and in the region as a whole). The U.S. government must acknowledge that human rights, representative government, and geopolitical interests are not mutually exclusive. Instead of increasing American security, continuing arm the Saudi military to fight Shi’as in Yemen and Bahrain results in greater risk. Over the last four years of the Trump administration, GCC countries, Bahrain included, have enjoyed a seemingly unconditional friend in the White House.[17] With the recent election of Joe Biden, however, this is likely to change. The Biden-Harris administration has already promised to reevaluate the U.S.-Saudi relationship, advocating for decreased arms deals and a higher standard of human rights. As of February 4, 2021, the Biden administration has put some of this promise into action by ending U.S. support of the Saudi war in Yemen.[18] (There is concern, though, over whether or not the new administration is more concerned with aid to Yemen or protection of Saudi Arabia.[19]) Biden has also promised to reopen negotiations with the Iranians and, if possible, reenter the JCPOA.[20] Will this potential shift in U.S.-GCC dynamics readjust the status quo in Bahrain? Will a weakened Saudi subsequently strengthen Shi’i Bahrainis? While it remains to be seen whether or not these changes will occur, these questions and potentially shifting dynamics are certainly consequential for Bahrain.

The Future of U.S. Foreign Policy in Bahrain

In the meantime, and as it stands, it is impossible for Bahrainis themselves to transform the government in their own country alone as a result of the strength of the powers that be. The U.S. government must be honest with itself about its role in facilitating autocratic governance and oppression in Bahrain. With the transition of power, the United States must harness this long overdue opportunity to reevaluate the wisdom of its strategy of turning a blind eye to the ruling family’s oppression of its Shi’i citizens and, instead, to recognize both the negative human rights implications of this as well as the damage it does to American security as a whole.

A foreseeable issue that policymakers may have regarding this analysis is to what extent U.S. interests would be threatened in the event of a democratic transition in Bahrain. Throughout the region, democratic elections have produced results that were thought to be counter-productive to long standing U.S. strategies, such as in Egypt and Palestine. Why would Bahrain be any different? Why would a new democratically elected Bahraini government wish to align with U.S. interests, especially when the United States has been a staunch ally of the very regime that has been so repressive of many of its citizens? The promist of a democratic Bahrain that works genuinely with the United States could in fact push stability in the Middle East at large, and would create less risks and costs for U.S. national security in the long run. History has proven that authoritarianism does not ensure stability. Furthermore, U.S. support of these various types of authoritarian governments often encourages anti-American sentiment. While democratization can be a long and messy process, promoting democratic governance is in the best interest of the United States.

In truth, though, there is little hope of a future democratic Bahrain complying with the status quo relationship with the United States. Previous U.S. policy in the region at large has been chaotic, and it remains to be seen whether or not the Biden administration will take serious steps to streamline American goals and strategy. American policymakers must understand that inconsistencies in U.S. policy towards Iran, Syria, Israel, and the GCC all need to resolve and standardize for good policy to be implemented elsewhere. History has proven time and again that chaos in the United States’ approach to one country inevitably translates into chaos in its approach to others. The 2011 uprising was not the first time Bahrainis have demanded democratic reform, and it is unlikely to be the last. In any case, it must be emphasized that authoritarian states governed by a minority group are unsustainable, and the United States would do well to encourage democratic reform and to support the Bahraini Shi’is in their quest for greater representation. Doing so is key to both protecting U.S. interests, its reputation in the region, and to supporting human rights abroad.

Will Crass is currently pursuing his master’s at The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University, where he focuses on Southwest Asia and International Negotiation/Conflict Resolution. He is interested in the intersection of politics and religion, as well as political movements in Iraq and the Levant. He is currently researching Northern Iraq’s Disputed Territories, with an eye on the ongoing negotiations between the KRG and the Iraqi Federal Government regarding issues of territory, budget allocation and oil revenue sharing. He is a student-scholar with the Fletcher Initiative on Religion, Law, and Diplomacy (RLD).

Juliana Rordorf is a candidate for an M.A. in Law and Diplomacy at The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University where she focuses on International Political Economy and the Gulf. She is interested in economic policy in the Gulf, Islamic finance, public-private partnerships, and issues of national security; specifically in the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia. She is a student-scholar with the Fletcher Initiative on Religion, Law, and Diplomacy (RLD).

 

Captions

Figure 1. Hundreds of thousands of Bahrainis protest the suppressive tactics of the regime by participating in a march where they reaffirm their loyalty to those killed by security forces. Courtesy Wikicommons.

Figure 2. Protesters gather at the Pearl Roundabout. Courtesy Wikicommons.

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